UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported

Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

3-23-2012

State v. Pena Respondent's Brief Dckt. 38247

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported
Recommended Citation
"State v. Pena Respondent's Brief Dckt. 38247" (2012). Not Reported. 93.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/93

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please
contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ID
STATE OF IDAHO,

)

)
}
}

Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

)
)

TRAVIS 0. PENA,

}

OPY

NO. 38247

)

Defendant-Appellant.

}

_____________ )

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF LEWIS

HONORABLE JOHN H. BRADBURY
District Judge

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
Attorney General
State of Idaho
PAUL R. PANTHER
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Criminal Law Division

ELIZABETH A. ALLRED
State Appellate
Public Defender
364 7 Lake Harbor Lane
Boise, Idaho 83703
(208) 334-2712

LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
P.0. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
(208) 334-4534
ATTORNEYS FOR
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT

ATTORNEY FOR
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .............................................................................. ii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .......................................................................... 1
Nature of the Case ................................................................................ 1
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings ................................... 1
ISSUE ..............................................................................................................3
ARGUMENT ....................................................................................................4
The State Presented Substantial Competent
Evidence To Support The Restitution Award ....................................... .4
A.

lntroduction .................................................................................4

B.

Standard Of Review .................................................................. .4

C.

Substantial Evidence Supports The District Court's
Finding That The Damage To The Patrol Vehicle
Was Caused By Pena's Criminal Conduct ................................. 5

CONCLUSION ............................................................................................... 11
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ......................................................................... 12

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
PAGE

CASES

Cramer v. Slater, 146 Idaho 868,204 P.3d 508 (2009) .................................... 5, 6
In Re Doe, 146 Idaho 277, 192 P.3d 1101 (Ct. App. 2008) ................................. .4
Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007} ................................................................... 11
State v. Card, 146 Idaho 111, 190 P.3d 930 (Ct. App. 2008) .............................. .4
State v. Corbus, 150 Idaho 599, 249 P.3d 398 (2011) ........................... 5, 6, 9, 10
State v. Cottrell,
P.3d
2012 WL 386594
(Idaho App., Feb. 8, 2012) .................................................................. 6, 7, 9, 10
State

v. Higley:, 151 Idaho 76,253 P.3d 750 (Ct. App. 2010) .............................. .4

State v. Lampien, 148 Idaho 367, 223 P.3d 750 (2009) ....................................... 5
State v. Smith, 144 Idaho 687, 169 P.3d 275 (Ct. App. 2007) ......................... .4, 5
State v. Tay:lor, 67 Idaho 313, 177 P .2d 468 ( 1947) ........................................... 10

STATUTES
1.C. § 19-5304 ...................................................................................................... 5

ii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Travis 0. Pena appeals from the Order For Restitution entered after he
pied guilty to and received a withheld judgment for felony eluding a law
enforcement officer.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
On January 10, 2010, law enforcement officers responded to a report that
Pena "was intoxicated and out of control, and was striking people" at a residence
in Kamiah, Idaho. (PSI, pp.1, 15, 18; 1

also 10/13/10 Tr., p.6, L.15 - p.7,

L.12.) When officers approached the residence, Pena fled in a pickup truck.
(PSI, pp.1-2, 15, 18; 10/13/10 Tr., p.7, L.19 - p.8, L.1.) A high-speed chase
ensued, during which Pena ran numerous stop signs, crashed through metal
stock gates, drove straight at and narrowly missed hitting two patrol vehicles, and
almost hit a different patrol vehicle "head-on." (PSI, pp.2, 15-16, 18-19; 10/13/10
Tr., p.8, L.7 - p.11, L.25.) Ultimately, Pena drove the pickup at a high rate of
speed up a "goat trail," which "was reported to be a narrow, unmaintained dirt
road with deep ruts, a high center, running ground water, and overgrown brush
hanging out into the pathway."

(PSI, pp.2, 16, 19.) An officer attempted to

pursue Pena on the "goat trail" but "his patrol vehicle stopped abruptly, sank into
a deep hole, and got stuck," causing damage to the vehicle's radiator and
cooling fan. (PSI, pp.2, 16, 19, 24; see also 10/13/10 Tr., p.12, Ls.11-17.) The

1

Unnumbered pages attached to the PSI have been numbered consecutively,
beginning at page 12.
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vehicle had to be towed and cost a total of $869.38 to repair. (PSI, pp.2-3, 24;
R, p.21; 10/13/10Tr., p.13, L.9-p.15, L.1.)
The state charged Pena with felony eluding a law enforcement officer.
(R., pp.9-10.)

Pena pied guilty (R., p.14), and the district court withheld

judgment and placed Pena on probation for five years (R., pp.24-27). Following
a restitution hearing, the district court entered an order requiring Pena to pay
restitution in the amount of $1,055.91. (R., pp.28-30.) Of that amount, $869.38
represented the amount it cost the Lewis County Sheriff's Office to have the
damaged patrol vehicle repaired. (10/13/10 Tr., p.20, L.21 - p.21, L.9;

also

R., pp.18-21 (Memorandum Of Restitution).) Pena timely appealed. (R., pp.3234.)

2

ISSUE
Pena states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err in ordering Mr. Pena to pay $1,055.91 in
restitution?
(Appellant's brief, p.3.)
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as:
Did the state present substantial competent evidence to support the
restitution award?
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ARGUMENT
The State Presented Substantial Competent Evidence To Support The
Restitution Award
A.

Introduction
The district court ordered Pena to pay restitution in the amount of $869.38

for costs associated with the repair of the damaged patrol vehicle. (10/13/10 Tr.,
p.20, L.21 - p.21, L.5.) On appeal, Pena is "[m]indful that the State presented
substantial evidence that the patrol vehicle was damaged during the commission
of the eluding charge." (Appellant's brief, p.4.) He contends, however, that the
pursuing officer assumed the risk that the patrol vehicle would be damaged when
he followed Pena up the dirt road and, as such, Pena should not be required to
"shoulder[] the whole damage." (Appellant's brief, pp.5-6.) Pena's argument is
without merit. A review of the record and the applicable law supports the district
court's determination that the damage to the patrol vehicle was caused by
Pena's criminal conduct and, as such, Pena is responsible for the full amount of
economic loss associated with the repair of that vehicle.

B.

Standard Of Review
The decision whether to order restitution and in what amount is committed

to the trial court's discretion. State v. Higley, 151 Idaho 76, 78, 253 P.3d 750,
752 (Ct. App. 201 O); State v. Card, 146 Idaho 111, 114, 190 P.3d 930, 933 (Ct.
App. 2008); In Re Doe, 146 Idaho 277, 284, 192 P.3d 1101, 1108 (Ct. App.
2008); State v. Smith, 144 Idaho 687, 692, 169 P.3d 275, 280 (Ct. App. 2007).
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The trial court's factual findings in relation to restitution will not be disturbed if
supported by substantial evidence. Smith, 144 Idaho at 692, 169 P.3d at 280.

C.

Substantial Evidence Supports The District Court's Finding That The
Damage To The Patrol Vehicle Was Caused By Pena's Criminal Conduct
Idaho Code § 19-5304(2) authorizes a court to "order a defendant found

guilty of any crime which results in an economic loss to the victim to make
restitution to the victim." For purposes of Idaho's restitution statute, a "victim"
includes any "person or entity, who suffers economic loss or injury as the result

of the defendant's criminal conduct." I.C. § 19-5304(1)(e)(i) (emphasis added).
"Economic loss" includes, among other things, "the value of property taken,
destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed ... resulting from the criminal conduct."
I.C. § 19-5304(1)(a) (emphasis added). "Therefore, in order for restitution to be
appropriate, there must be a causal connection between the conduct for which
the defendant is convicted and the injuries suffered by the victim."

State v.

Corbus, 150 Idaho 599, 602, 249 P.3d 398,401 (2011).
As recently reiterated by the Idaho Supreme Court, "causation consists of
actual cause and true proximate cause."
367, 374, 223 P.3d 750, 757 (2009)).

kl (citing

State v. Lampien, 148 Idaho

The court articulated the distinction

between actual and proximate cause as follows:
"Actual cause is the factual question of whether a particular event
produced a particular consequence. [Lampien, 148 Idaho at 374,
223 P.3d at 757] (quoting [Cramer v. Slater, 146 Idaho 868, 875,
204 P .3d 508, 515 (2009)]).
The "but for" test is used in
circumstances where there is only one actual cause or where two
or more possible causes were not acting concurrently. Id. On the
other hand, true proximate cause deals with "whether it was
reasonably foreseeable that such harm would flow from the
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negligent conduct." Id. (quoting Cramer, 146 Idaho at 875, 204
P.3d at 515). In analyzing proximate cause, this Court must
determine whether the injury and manner of occurrence are so
highly unusual "that a reasonable person, making an inventory of
the possibilities of harm which his conduct might produce, would
not have reasonably expected the injury to occur." Id. (quoting
Cramer, 146 Idaho at 875, 204 P.3d at 515).
Corbus, 150 Idaho at 602, 249 P.3d at 401. See also State v. Cottrell,_ P.3d
_ , 2012 WL 386594, *3 (Idaho App., Feb. 8, 2012) (remittitur issued March 3,
2012). The determinations of actual cause and proximate cause are both factual
questions. Corbus, 150 Idaho at 602, 249 P.3d at 401; Cottrell,_ P.3d at_,
2012 WL 386594, *3.
Applying the two-part causation inquiry to the facts before it, the Corbus
court upheld an award of restitution for injuries sustained by the victim when he
jumped out of Corbus' vehicle in the course of a police chase. 150 Idaho at 60206, 401-05. Regarding actual cause, the court found that, but for "Corbus' acts
of driving recklessly and eluding police officers and then failing to stop in
response to their overhead emergency lights," the victim "would not have needed
to" jump from the vehicle.

kl

at 603, 249 P .3d at 402. The court also found

proximate cause existed because, based on the evidence that showed "Corbus
had created an extremely dangerous situation for his passenger by driving at
night, at excessive speeds, with no headlights on ... , it was reasonably
foreseeable that his passenger would decide to jump from the vehicle to avoid a
potentially serious car accident." k!_. at 605, 249 P.3d at 404.
More recently, in Cottrell, supra, the Idaho Court of Appeals upheld an
award of restitution to the police officer victim for a knee injury he sustained
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when he attempted to restrain Cottrell white Cottrell actively resisted and
obstructed the officer's attempt to arrest him.
at *2-5.

P.3d at

2012 WL 386594

The court concluded that actual cause was "satisfied because the

evidence show[ed] it was Cottrell's acts of attempting to pull away from [the
officer] during arrest that precipitated the need for [the officer] to gain control of
Cottrell and, in so doing, twist his knee."
(footnote omitted).

lih

at _ , 2012 WL 386594 at *4

The court also found proximate cause, reasoning it was

reasonably foreseeable, based on Cottrell's repeated failures to obey the
officer's requests and submit to arrest, "that Cottrell's conduct would elicit a
physical response from [the officer], putting [the officer] in a position to injure his
knee."

lih at_, 2012 WL 386594 at *5.
As in Corbus and Cottrell, a review of the evidence presented at the

restitution hearing in this case supports the district court's award of restitution
and, more specifically, its finding that the damage to the patrol vehicle was
caused by Pena's criminal conduct. While the district court did not specifically
use the words "actual cause," it did find that the officer would not have been
pursuing Pena, and thus would not have "been at the mud hole" that damaged
the patrol vehicle, "but for" Pena's eluding conduct. (10/13/10 Tr., p.20, Ls.1017.) This finding is supported by substantial evidence.

Lewis County Sheriff

Brian Brokop testified that, when law enforcement officers responded to the
report of a disturbance at a residence, Pena fled from the residence in a pickup
truck, travelled at high rates of speed on icy roads, ignored officers' sirens and
emergency lights, crashed through metal gates, drove directly at and narrowly
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missed hitting two patrol verlicles, and almost collided "head-on" with another
patrol vehicle driven by Deputy John Hescock. (10/13/10 Tr., p.6, L.1 - p.11,
L.25.) After Pena nearly hit him, Deputy Hescock pursued Pena "up a dirt road
that had very deep mud holes in it." (10/13/10 Tr., p.12, Ls.11-15.) It was during
that pursuit that the "patrol vehicle ended up getting stuck in one of the mud
holes, which caused damage to the vehicle."

(10/13/10 Tr., p.12, Ls.15-17.)

This evidence shows that, were it not for Pena's acts of driving recklessly,
eluding police officers and failing to stop in response to their emergency lights
and sirens, Deputy Hescock would never have driven up the dirt road and gotten
stuck in the mud hole that caused damage to the patrol vehicle. Actual cause is
thus satisfied in this case.
There is also substantial evidence in the record to support the finding that
Pena's criminal conduct was the proximate cause of the damage to the patrol
vehicle. During his argument at the conclusion of the restitution hearing, defense
counsel argued that Pena should not be held responsible for the full amount of
restitution because, by following Pena up the dirt road, Deputy Hescock
unreasonably assumed the risk that his patrol vehicle might be damaged.
(10/13/10 Tr., p.20, Ls.2-9.) The district court rejected this argument, concluding
that Pena had a duty to stop and, given his failure to do so, the pursuit by Deputy
Hescock "was certainly permissible if not required." (10/13/10 Tr., p.20, Ls.1015.) The district court was correct. The evidence unequivocally shows that, in
an attempt to elude the officers, Pena ignored the officers' lights and sirens and
drove extremely recklessly, endangering both life and property.
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(10/13/10 Tr.,

p.6, L.1 - p.11, L.25, p.12, Ls.11-15.)

Given Pena's eluding conduct, it was

reasonably foreseeable that Deputy Hescock, an officer charged with upholding
and enforcing the law, would pursue Pena up the dirt road where the patrol
vehicle was ultimately damaged.

(See 10/13/10 Tr., p.12, L.24 - p.13, L.2

(testimony that "Deputy Hescock was attempting to carry out the duties of his
office as he followed that pickup up that road").)
Pena does not seriously contend that the evidence presented at the
restitution hearing does not support a finding that his criminal conduct was both
the actual and proximate cause of the damage to the patrol vehicle.

In fact,

Pena does not even mention the words "actual cause" or "proximate cause" in
his Appellant's brief, nor does he cite Corbus, supra, or any other case that
actually pertains to the issue of causation.

Instead, he contends in wholly

conclusory fashion that the state "failed to present substantial evidence that all of
the damage caused was the result of Mr. Pena's criminal activity" because, as
argued by defense counsel below, the officer unreasonably assumed the risk
that the patrol vehicle might be damaged when he followed Pena up the dirt
road.

(Appellant's brief, pp.4-5.)

This argument is not only unsupported by

citation to any legal authority, it is also nearly identical to arguments specifically
considered and rejected by the Idaho appellate courts in Corbus and Cottrell,
supra. In both cases, the defendants argued that the victims did not have to take

the actions that resulted in their injuries. Corbus, 150 Idaho at 605-06, 249 P.3d
at 404-05; Cottrell,_ P.3d at_, 2012 WL 386594 at *5. As explained by the
court in Cottrell, however, the fact that a victim chooses to take a particular

9

course of action in response to the defendant's criminal conduct is not itself a
basis for relieving the defendant of liability for the victim's injuries:
It is no defense to say Officer Sullivan did not have to tackle
Cottrell any more than it was a defense in Corbus to say that the
passenger did not have to jump out of the vehicle - an argument
that was put forward and rejected by the Idaho Supreme Court.
This argument is more accurately an attempt to point to an
intervening cause, meaning a voluntary act by another that breaks
the causal chain. [Corbus, 150 Idaho] at 602, 605, 249 P.3d at
401, 404. To break the causal chain, though, requires that the
victim's conduct was unforeseeable and an extraordinary
occurrence. Id. at 606, 249 P.3d at 405. Cottrell makes no
argument that Officer Sullivan's reaction was excessive,
extraordinary, or unreasonable. The record shows that Cottrell
repeatedly dismissed Officer Sullivan's requests for Cottrell to
cooperate and submit to arrest. It was only after Cottrell continued
to evade Officer Sullivan that Officer Sullivan took actions to control
Cottrell. Therefore, it was foreseeable that Cottrell's conduct would
elicit a physical response from Officer Sullivan, putting Officer
Sullivan in a position to injure his knee.
Cottrell,_ P.3d at_, 2012 WL 386594 at *5.
Like the arguments in Corbus and Cottrell, Pena's argument that Deputy
Hescock assumed the risk of injury is really a claim that Deputy Hescock
performed a voluntary act that broke the causal chain between Pena's criminal
conduct and the damage that ultimately resulted to the patrol vehicle.

As

explained by the Idaho Supreme Court in Corbus, however, "[g]enerally, the
contributory negligence of the victim is not enough to relieve the defendant of
criminal liability."

Corbus, 150 Idaho at 606, 249 P.3d at 405 (citing State v.

Taylor, 67 Idaho 313, 316, 177 P.2d 468, 470 (1947)). Rather, to be relieved of
liability for the victim's injuries the victim's conduct must have been an
"unforeseeable and an extraordinary occurrence."

Cottrell, _

P.3d at _ ,

2012 WL 386594 at *5 (citing Corbus, 150 Idaho at 606, 249 P.3d at 405). As in
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Corbus and Cottrell, such is not the case here.

Deputy Hescock is a law

enforcement officer whose duty it is to enforce and uphold the law. Given the
dangerous manner in which Pena was driving and his eluding behavior, it was
not only reasonably foreseeable, but also entirely expected, that Deputy Hescock
would pursue him. Cf. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007) (officer's pursuit and
use of force to apprehend fleeing motorist was reasonable and necessary to
protect human life).
Substantial evidence supports the district court's finding that the damage
to the patrol vehicle was caused by Pena's criminal conduct. Pena has failed to
establish an abuse of discretion in the restitution award.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the Order Withholding
Judgment and Imposing Probation and the Order for Restitution.
rd

DATED this 23 day of March 2012.
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 23 rd day of March 2012, served a
true and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a
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ELIZABETH ANN ALLRED
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the
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LAF/pm

12

